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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANCES R. PURDIE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, 
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDU-
CATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY of the 
University of Utah, CLAUDE W. 
GRANT, JOSEPH C. BENTLEY, 
ROBERT E. FINLEY, ADELAIDE 
FUHRllVIAN, REED M. MERRILL, 
RALPH E. PACKARD, JAMES P. 
PAPPAS, MICHAEL J. PATTON, 
and JOHN DOES I through VII, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 15209 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff, Ms. Purdie, filed an action in the District Court of the 
Third Judicial District in the County of Salt Lake alleging that defendants had 
invidiously discriminated against her by denying her application for admittance 
to the counseling psychology program of the Department of Educational Psy-
chology as a Ph. D. candidate. Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief 
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to prevent alleged discrimination solely on the basis of age in the defend-
ants' admission procedures. The defendants answered denying that ag , e \,, 
the sole criteria by which the plaintiff's application had been denied, that: 
plaintiff had failed to avail herself of the administrative remedies still ava 
able to her, and that even if age had been used as a criterion for admissior 
an educational program, it would be reasonable in light of the limited resc 
ces available for educating persons in the field of Educational Psychology, 
II 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that 
failed to state a cause of action, pursuant to Rule 12 (b) (6) of the Utah Rut. 
of Civil Procedure. Upon stipulation of the parties, the factual allegation: 
the plaintiff's complaint was deemed admitted for the purpose of the Motio· 
Dismiss. The parties agreed that graduate education in Educational Psyci 
ogy is a limited resource. The District Court held that "age" can be a fac 
in decisions such as admission to a graduate program and the use of this! 
is not a denial of equal protection as guaranteed by the Constitution. Ther 
tiff appealed the dismissal of the complaint. 
III 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-Respondents seek to have the decision of the lower coL 
upheld. 
-2-
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IV 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1975, the plaintiff applied for admission to the Educational Psy-
chology program as a Ph. D. candidate. At that time, she was 51 years old 
and had previously received a Bachelor's degree in Psychology/Sociology 
and also a Master's degree in Social Work, from the University of Utah. She 
was a certified social worker. 
At the time of her application, Claude W. Grant, Joseph C. Bentley, 
Robert E. Finley, Adelaide Fuhriman, Reed M. Merrill, Ralph E. Packard, 
James P. Pappas, and Michael J. Patton were members of the Admissions 
Committee or faculty of the Department of Educational Psychology. Because 
of various conflicts, Ms. Fuhriman and 1\Iessrs. Grant and Packard did not 
participate in the sessions which dealt with the plaintiff's application. The 
Admissions Committee and the faculty of the Department of Educational Psy-
chology had the responsibility to review applications for admittance to the coon-
seling psychology program of the Department of Educational Psychology. 
In the year that plaintiff applied, there were 125 applicants for 13 posi-
tions. It is readily apparent, and the parties have stipulated, that positions in 
the Ph. D. program in Educational Psychology constituted a limited resource. 
The applicants were broken down into four groups according to appropriate ad-
mission test scores and cumulative gradepoint averages. To provide a full, 
rich educational program consisting of diverse views and attitudes, one-half of 
-3-
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available positions were allocated to out-of-state students. In addition, 
sixty per cent (60%) of the positions were allocated to persons holding ont, 
bachelor degrees. Forty per cent (40o/o) of the positions are allocated tor 
sons holding masters degrees. The plaintiff, being a resident of the state 
holding a masters degree was, in all likelihood, considered for one of thr 
positions in the program. The plaintiff was not selected for one of the tbu 
teen positions. The reasons for her nonselection were not limited to age< 
However, for the purposes of this appeal and the motion to dismiss in the. 
court, the parties have stipulated that plaintiff's rejection was based onh, 
The plaintiff made application again for the fall term of 1977. Att' 
same time she filed the above-mentioned action in the Third Judicial Distr 
Court requesling that the court declare that the policy and practice of the'. 
versity of Utah, the Department of Educational Psychology, and all other: 
defendants constituted discrimination against older applicants and was ac 
of equal protection and due process. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief fro: 
practice in the future. 
The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on thegi 
that it failed to state a cause of action for which relief could be granted. i 
the purpose of that motion, and only for that purpose, the defendants stip' 
that the allegations contained in plaintiff's complaint were true, that age· 
used as a criterion for evaluation of applicants to various educational pro 
of the University of Utah. 
-4-
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The court be low rightly decided that age was a reasonable factor to 
use in allocating this limited resource. This decision was appealed. 
v 
ARGUMENT 
POlNT I 
THE USE OF AGE AS A DETERMINANT FOR ADMISSION 
TO A GRADUATE LEVEL EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM DOES NOT 
VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION AS GUARANTEED 
BY THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 
The United States Supreme Court has in several cases dealt with the 
difficulty of drafting legislation and implementing those enactments which have 
uniform operation with regard to all classes and individuals. Neither langu-
age, nor man's ability to carry out the purpose behind the language. is exact 
enough to affect only those persons for which the action was intended. Recog-
nizing this, the Supreme Court has developed a two-tier approach to deal with 
cases where plaintiffs have complained that their right to equal protection has 
been trampled upon by the state. According to this rationale. states are given 
a wide latitude in formulating and effecting their policies. except where the 
states touch upon what the court calls "suspect classifications" or "fundamen-
tal interests". In those cases, the state action is examined with "struct judi-
cial scrutiny". If, however, the classification does rot invade a fundamental 
interest, or in some way touch upon a suspect classification, the court takes 
a deferential view of the state action and a "rational basis" standard of review 
-5-
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is used, (See McGown v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Eo 
2d 393, (1961); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 251 
Ed. 2d 491 (1970). In order for this court to view action by the Admission, 
Commitee with "strict scrutiny", there must be present some suspect clas 
ification, or a fundamental interest. In the instant case, there is neither, 
A. Age is not a suspect classification. 
The plaintiff claims that she was not allowed entry into the Ph.D. r 
gram of the Department of Educational Psychology because of an alleged p: 
of that department to deny entrance to older applicants. Even if this were 
such a classification would not, of itself, be a "suspect classification" ace 
ing to the law as recently expounded by the U. S. Supreme Court. 
The U. S. Supreme Court has listed those classifications which itr 
gards as suspect. They include race, McLaughton v. Florida, 379 U.S. I' 
85 S, Ct. 283, 13 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1964), alienage, Graham v. Richardson, r 
U.S. 365, 91 S,Ct. 1848, 29 L,Ed. 534 (1971); national origin, Ogamav. 
California, 332 U.S. 633, 68 S. Ct. 269, 92 L. Ed. 249 (1948); illigitimacy, 
Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety, 406 U.S. 164, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 31L.I 
2d 768 (1972). "Age" is not among these classifications. 
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 
93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1973), the court gives a description ofwh• 
is considered a suspect classification: 
-6-
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[ I]t is clear that appellant's suit asks that court to review 
a system that allegedly discriminates against a large, di-
yprse, and amorphous class, unified in districts that happen 
to have less taxable wealth than other districts. The system 
of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none 
of the traditional indicia of suspectness; the class is not sad-
dled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of 
purposeful inequal treatment or relegated to such a position 
of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary pro-
tection from the majoritarian political process. Id at 28. 
Older individuals are not "subject to such a history of purposeful unequal 
treatment" as are blacks, American Indians or Asian-Americans. They have 
not been denied the right to vote, nor excluded from the political process in any 
way. One need only look to the median age of the various legislative, executive, 
and judicial branches of the state and national government to see that older per-
sons are not in such a position of "political powerlessness" that the court must 
look with "strict judicial scrutiny" at any action which tends to classify the older' 
person differently than others. 
The most recent U. S. Supreme Court decision looking into this matter 
is Massachusetts Board of Retirement, et al v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 96 S. Ct. 
2562, 49 L. Ed. 2d 520 (1976) (hereinafter Murgia) which dealt with a Massachu-
setts statute requiring the retirement of all state troopers over 50 years of age. 
Mr. Murgia asserted that this constituted state action in violation to his rights 
guaranteed under the Equal Protection Clause. He asserted that age was a 
11 II • "th II tr• t t• II suspect classification and demanded the court examme wt s lC scru my 
the statute. The Supreme Court disagreed with him. In a per curium decision, 
the court held: 
-7-
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Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to subject 
the state's resolution to competing interests in this case 
to the degree of critical examination that our case under 
the Equal Protection Clause recently have characterized 
as "strict judie ial scrutiny". (at 314) 
The reason for the court's refusal to apply the strict scrutiny stan: 
in this case was that it did not find age to be a suspect classification. As! 
at 313: 
The class subject to the compulsory retirement feature 
of the Massachusetts statute consists of uniformed state 
police officers over the age of 50. It cannot be said to 
discriminate only against the elderly. Rather, it draws 
a line at a certain age in middle life. But even old age 
does not define a "discrete and insular" group, United 
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153, 
N.Y. (1938), in need of 'extraordinary protection from 
the majoritarian process". Instead, it works a stage that 
each of us will reach if we live out our normal span. Even 
if the statute could be said to impose a penalty upon a class 
defined as aged, it would not impose a distinction sufficiently 
akin to those classifications that we have found suspect to call 
for strict judie ial scrutiny. 
Several state and federal courts have also refused to hold age as a 
classification. This court, in Coleman v. Dept. of Employment Security< 
of Review, 29 Utah 2d 326, 509 P. 2d 355 (1973) dealt with the issue ofwhe. 
a section of the Employment Compensation Act (Title 35-4 UCA 1953) was 
constitutional. The Act required unemployment compensation to be reduc; 
50% of any amount received by the individual under a retirement plan wher 
employer and employee contributed. This 5 ,ction was held not constitu' 
offensive to equal protection, even though obviously those who were mosi 
ed by this statute were elderly persons. 
-8-
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In Everhart v. Knebel, 424 F. Supp. 390, 394, n. 6 (D. Conn. 
1976), the court said: 
The plaintiffs do not and could not claim they are entitled 
to a more stringent standard of review. Age does not in-
voke that higher level of scrutiny. 
Another statement made by the court in Taxpayers Association of 
Weymouth Township, Inc. v, Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 
1016 (1976) follows this reasoning in stating that age is not a "suspect" cri-
terion. 
It is not difficult to see the reasons for the court's reluctances to 
hold age in the same "suspect classification" as it does, say, race. Race 
is an immutable characteristic determined solely by accident of birth. 
While considered superficially, age is also a quality fixed at birth which 
would not be changed except by the passage of time. But the difference lies 
in the fact that age and the aging process is something which has impact on 
everyone. 
The reasons behind classifications based upon age are entirely dif-
ferent than those which gave rise to racial discrimination. In 1967. Willar 
Wirtz, then Secretary of Labor, testified before a House Subcommittee in-
vestigating the need for and scope of age discrimination in legislation: 
I would suggest that this kind of discrimination is entirely 
different from racial discrimination, the root of racial 
discrimination is pure bigotry. This is not true here. 
[Maste v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 427 F. Supp. 1299, 
1306 (E. D. Mich. 1976)] 
We all pass through the various stages of life, each with its legal con-
-9-
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sequences. Those under a certain age are excluded from public schools 
(Montana v. School District #1 of Fergus County, 348 P. 2d 797 (Mont. l% 
Younger persons are unable to vote or hold public office (Garent v. Bro,~n 
-~41F. Supp. 1187, 409U.S. 809aff'gmem. (S.D. Ohio1972);HumanR;, 
-------:.::_ 
Partyv. Secretary of State, 370 F. Supp. 921, 414 U.S. 1058 aff'gmem, 
Mich. 1973). When closely examined, these classifications exclude from, 
torial franchise persons who may be mature enough to handle the political 
cisions necessary to fulfill the responsibilities of full-fledged citizenship, 
these individual exclusions are tolerated. 
B. Admission to a graduate level educational program is not a fun 
mental interest. 
The second trigger of strict judicial scrutiny of claims arising unc 
Equal Protection Clause are those touching fundamental interests. The~. 
Supreme Court has held that education is not one of these "fundamental if, 
ests". In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra, a! 
the court said: 
It is the province of this court to create substantive rights 
in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. 
Thus, the key to discovering whether education is "funda-
mental" is not to be found in comparisons of the relative 
societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence 
or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether edu-
cation is as important as the right to travel. Rather, the 
answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to educa-
tion explicitly or impliedly guaranteed by the Constitution . 
Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded ex-
plicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we 
find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected. As we 
-10-
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have said, the undisputed importance of education will not 
alone cause this court to depart from the usual standard 
for reviewing a state's social and economic legislation. 
Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U.S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600, commented upon "fundamental 
rights": 
The court does not 'pick out' particular human activities, 
characterize them as 'fundamental', and give them added 
protection ... Contrary, the court simply recognizes, 
as it must, an established constitutional right, and give 
to that right no less protection that the Constitution itself 
gives. 394 U.S. at 642 (emphasis in the original) 
The United States Constitution does not guarantee a right to education. 
The Constitution of the State of Utah extends the right to education to a 
select group within the state; namely, children. Appellant does not fall within 
the benefited class. 
The Legislature shall provide for the: 
establishment and maintenance of a uniform system of public 
schools, which shall be open to all children of the state, and 
free from sectarian control. Constitution of Utah, Art. X, 
Sec. 1. 
Contrary to the position advanced by plaintiff-appellant, the framers did 
not intend that the state's public schools be open to the entire population of the 
state. When a right was granted to the entire population of the state, terms such 
as "men" (Art. I, Sec. I), "people" (Art. I, Sec. 2 & 6), "person" (Art. I, Sec. 7) 
"citizens" (Art. IV, Sec. 1), are used. Certain specific privileges were directed 
at children. Public schools were to be open to children, Art. III & IV, Art. X, 
Sec. 31. In another con text, the framers directed the legislature to 
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prohibit the employment of children in underground mines: 
The Legislature shall prohibit: 
(1) The employment of women, or of children under the 
age of fourteen years, in underground mines. Constitu-
tion of Utah, Art. XVI, Sec. 3. 
Art. III and IV and Art. X, Sec. 1 of the Constitution of the State! 
Utah were not intended to open the public schools to all persons. Had thL 
the intent of the framers, a term other than "children" would have beenu 
describe the group. The framers' use of the term "children" in Art. m, 
graph 4 and Art. X, Sec. 1 and elsewhere in the Constitution granted pri; 
to a specific group within the population, namely children, and did not gr: 
privileges to the population generally. 
This court has rendered ::. similar interpretation of Art. X, Sec. 
In Logan City School Dist. v. Kowallis, 94 Utah 342, 77 P.2d 341 
this court said: 
The requirement that schools must be open to all children 
of the state is a prohibition against any law or rule which 
would separate or divide the children of the state into class-
es or groups, and grant, allow, or provide one group or 
class educational privileges or advantages denied another. 
No child of school age, resident within the state, can be 
lawfully denied admission to the schools of the state because 
of race, color, location, religion, politics, or any other bar 
or barrier which may be set up which would deny to such a 
child equality of educational opportunities or facilities with 
all other children of the state. 77 P. 2d at 350. (emphasis added 
This interpretation by this court is consistent with other judicial 
ments. In the case of Miller v. Finegan, 26 Fla. 29, 7 So. 140 (1890), 
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ida court said: 
-The word 'children' when used irrespective of parentage, 
may donate that class of persons under the age of twenty-
one years as distinguished from adults, but its ordinary 
meaning with respect to parentage is sons and daughters, 
of whatever age. 7 So. at 142 (emphasis added) 
In the case of State ex rel Slinkard v. Grebe, 249 S. w. 2d 468 (Mo. 
App. 1952), the Missouri court stated that the term "children" as used in an 
education statute had reference to school age children. 
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia took a similar position in 
Northrop, et al v. City of Richmond, 105 Va. 335, 52 S, E. 962 (1906). 
To assert that the term "children" as used in Article X, Section I of the 
Utah Constitution included all persons within the state would lead to an absurd 
result. All persons within the state could thus assert that they had a constitu-
tional right to attend law school or medical school, or any other public school 
of the state regardless of program capacity or individual qualifications. Such 
was certainly not the framer's intent. 
The term "children" as used in Article III, Paragraph 4 and Article X, 
Sec. 1 does not include all residents of the state but establishes a distinct group 
for which access to the state's public schools is constitutionally protected. Ap-
pellants erroneously asserts that she is included within the group. Appellant, 
therefore, has no constitutionally protected right to admission to the state's 
public schools. 
Neither does appellant have a right to education because it may lead to 
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employment. Employment in and of itsPlf is not a right. Hather, individ 
are protected from unjustified state interference with existing employrnen~ 
lationships. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36 S.Ct. 7, 60 L.Ed. 131 
Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 30, 34 S.Ct. 681, 58 L.Ed. 1129 (1914). 
Appellant had no fundamental right to admission to the Ph.D. progr 
Educational Psychology at the University of Utah. Her complaint should, 1 
fore, be examined using the "rational basis" standard. 
POINT II 
GIVEN THE LIMITED RESOURCE OF GRADUATE 
EDUCATION IN EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY, 
IT WAS RATIONAL AND PROPER FOR THE 
RESPONDENTS TO ALLOCATE 
THIS RESOURCE ON THE BASIS OF AGE 
The educational resources of the state of Utah are finite. The var 
stitutions of higher education within the state receive the majority of their 
tional funds through legislative appropriations. Structuring the academic 
to obtain optimal use of state funds is a difficult process, requiring the ex; 
of the institution, the Board of Higher Education, the Board of Regents, ar. 
Legislature. 
This court has recognized the complex nature of the decision-mak~ 
cess in education and has generally declined to reivew the conduct of educ< 
administration acting within the scope of their duties. In the early case ol. 
v. Board of Education North Summit School District, et al, 81 Utah 51, I· 
900 (1932), this court said: 
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It is well established that, if the action of the board of 
education is within the powers conferred upon it by the 
Legislature, and pertains to a matter in which the board 
is vested with authority to act, the courts will not review 
the action of such a board to substitute its judgment for 
that of the board as to matters within its discretion. 
Security National Bank v. Bagley, supra; 24 R. C. L. 573; 
Schmidt v. Blair, 203 Iowa 1016, 213 N. W. 593, McClure 
v. Board of Education, 38 Cal. App. 500, 176 P. 711. 
16 P. 2d at 903 (emphasis added) 
This court went oo to attach a presumption of reasonableness at the acts 
of school administrators performed within the scope of their authority: 
The courts will not interfere with the exercise of discretion by 
school directors in matters confided by law to their judgment, 
unless there is a clear abuse of the discretion, or a violation 
of law. So the courts are usually disinclined to interfere with 
regulations adopted by the school boards, and they will not con-
sider whether the regulations are wise or expedient, but merely 
whether they are a reasonable exercise of the power and dis-
cretion of the board. Acting reasonably within the powers con-
ferred, it is the province of the board of education to determine 
what things are detrimental to the successful management, good 
order, and discipline of the schools and the rules required to 
produce these conditions. The presumption is always in favor 
of the reasonableness and propriety of a rule or regulation duly 
made. The reasonableness of regulations is a question of law 
for the courts. 24 R. C. L. 57 5. See McQuillan, Municipal 
Corps. (2d Ed,) 421; McLeod v. State ex rel Colmer, 154 Miss. 
468, 122 So. 737, 63 A. L. R. 1161. 16 U 2d at 903 (emphasis 
added) 
This court will, therefore, not substitute its judgment for the judgment 
of university administrators when said administrators are acting within their 
scope of authority. Further, a presumption of reasonableness attachs if the 
questioned actions fall within the administrator's scope of authority. Applying 
this standard to the case at bar it is apparent that the lower court properly dis-
missed the complaint. 
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University presidents are given power over admissions at their res 
pective institutions: 
Unless the board shall reserve to itself such action, the 
president of each institution with the approval of the In-
stitutional Council: 
(5) May commit to the faculty of each institution, the 
general initiation and direction of instruction and of the 
examination, admission and classification of students • 
Sec. 53-48-15 (5), Utah Code Ann. (1953). 
The exercise of this power over admissions is presumed to be rea· 
sonable, Beard v. Board of Education, (supra). 
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that where state action is prest· 
reasonable such action will not be easily set aside. 
[The Equal Protection Clause] permits the state a wide scope 
of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of 
citizens differently than others. The Constitutional safeguard 
is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly 
irrelevant to the achievement of the state's objective. State 
legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitu-
tional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws re-
sult in some inequity. A statutory discrimination will not be 
set aside if any state of facts may be conceived to justify it. 
(McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 425-426, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 
6 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1961) (emphasis added). 
State action that is presumed correct will not be set aside "if any 
of facts may be conceived to justify it". The state action in the case at b; 
this test. The parties have stipulated that graduate education in the Edu: 
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Psychology field is a limited resource. It is not only reasonable but imperative 
that respondents allocate this resource to maximize the benefits to the state. 
The use of age as a factor in this allocation process is reasonable. 
As put by the court of Weiss v. Walsh, 324 F. Supp. 75. 77 (SDNY 1971) 
461 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1972), cert denied 409 U.S. 1129 (1973): 
Notwithstanding the great advances in gerontology. the era 
when advanced age ceases to be of some reasonable statistical 
relationship to the diminshed capacity or longevity is still in 
the future. It cannot be said, therefore, that age ceilings .•• 
are inherently suspect, although their applications will inevi-
tably fall unjustly in the individual case. 
The amount of time in which an individual can contribute to the state be-
cause of skills and knowledge gained in the Ph. D. program in Educational Psy-
chology is directly related to age. The younger the graduate. the greater the 
projected time of contribution. Thus, generally speaking, the greater the time 
period of contribution to the state. 
For example, A and B make application to the graduate program in Edu-
cational Psychology. A is twenty-five (25) and B is fifty (50). Both A and Bare 
expected to live to age seventy-two (72). The graduate program is a two (2) year 
program. Upon graduation at age twenty-seven (27). A has forty-five (45) years 
in which his skill and knowledge are available to the state. At the time of B's 
graduation, only nineteen (19} years are remaining in which to contribute. In 
order to achieve the optimum allocation of this limited resource so as to max-
imize the benefit to the state, age may be a factor in the selection process. 
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The requisite facts are present to sustain respondent's action and I' 
lower court properly dismissed the complaint. 
CONCLUSIOi\ 
Age is not a suspect classification. I\ either does the appellant en)o: 
constitutional right to education. The "rational basis" analysis is, therefor 
used to examine claims alleging Fourteenth Amendment violations. There 
pondents' actions are presumed correct and the "rational basis" test is saL 
fied if any state of facts can be reasonably conceived to justify the actions. 
limited resource of graduate education and the attendent need to efficiently 
cate this resource so as to maximize the benefit to the state justifies allo. 
on the basis of age. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Brinton R. Burbidge 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants-Respondents 
-18-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Respondents to Brian M. Barnard, Attorney at Law, 214 East Fifth South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and Mike Shepherd, Attorney at Law, 216 East 
Fifth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid in the United States 
Postal Service this 11th day of October, 1977. 
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